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Abstract 
The literature on the recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) focuses on the decimation of Western 
economies. However, the impact of the crisis on Asian economies has remained largely 
unexplored. Using the classic dependency approach of the ‘core-periphery’ framework, this 
paper investigates the trade performance of ASEAN members during the GFC (2008-2009) and 
after the GFC period (2010-2012) and analyses the transmission of shocks to these countries 
from the Western core. A modified gravity model of trade flows is estimated for a panel of five 
leading ASEAN economies and their trading partners for the period of 2002 to 2012. The 
empirical results show a decline in ASEAN trade during the financial crisis, which becomes 
stronger during the post-crisis period. The decline trade exceeds that associated with changing 
GDP at home and abroad, suggesting the crisis and its aftermath have been particularly 
disadvantageous for ASEAN trade. 
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GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN TRADE 
PERFORMANCE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
1. Introduction 
The global economy has recently experienced the deepest recession in the post-World War II era, 
known as the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), which originated in the Western ‘core’ economy, 
including the United States of America (US). Most core as well as periphery countries are now in 
the recovery stage, with a few periphery countries still in the severe recession stage. It is an 
appropriate time for economists and policy makers to analyze the impact of ‘core’ generated 
shocks transmitted to the periphery trading partners and to provide suggestions for future policy 
directions.  
The crisis initially hit the key advanced (core) economies, disrupted the performance of 
global financial markets and gradually transmitted shocks to periphery countries through the 
reduction of foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade flows.1 This may be seen as a Keynesian 
demand shock experienced by the Asian periphery countries, that is, a sudden decline in demand 
from the Western core economies, including the US and other developed countries, for periphery 
countries’ exports. In a recent study, Chor and Manova (2012) suggest that the sharp decline in 
world trade began in the last quarter of 2008 and accelerated during 2009, eventually exceeding 
the drop-in world GDP. McKibbin and Stoeckel (2009) attribute the acceleration partly to 
reappraisal of risk by households and private sector, and partly to increased protectionism by 
business sector. Reappraisal of risk occurs due to concern about potential contraction of global 
economy (essentially fueled by global media), which in turn reduces the propensity to consume 
for the household sector and causes declining investment by businesses. 
Though the literature on the recent GFC explores the decimation of the core developed 
economies, the significance of the crisis in periphery economies, especially for the ASEAN 
countries, remains largely unexplored.2 In a recent study, Hong and Tang (2012) indicate Asian 
                                               
1 For details, please see Pula (2014), who explains various mechanisms for how the shocks transmitted from the 
Western core economies, such as the Eurozone, to the periphery, such as West European Balkan economies 
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, the Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, 
Serbia, Slovenia). 
2 ASEAN is the Association of South East Asian Nations, which includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Brunei and Myanmar. 
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economies performed better in maintaining economic growth during GFC in spite of less active 
stimulus effort by their governments compared to OECD economies. However, little is known 
about how severely Asian exports and imports have been affected in the crisis and post-crisis 
periods. In particular, ASEAN economies are highly trade dependent, with manufacturing sectors 
that are export oriented and extensively exposed to the demand of the developed economies.  
In the past two decades of globalization, the importance of the major ASEAN economies 
in global trade has increased. This remarkable advance in ASEAN intra- and extra-regional 
economic and trade integration occurred after the 1997-98 Asian crisis. ASEAN has developed 
an intense trade relation with the US, EU (European Union), Australia and major Asian 
economies, such as China, Japan, Korea and India. Hence, both North-South and South-South 
trade are important for ASEAN economies.3 An in-depth investigation and understanding of the 
influence of global financial crisis on ASEAN trade is important for anticipating the impact of 
future crises originated either from either the core economy or the periphery economy (for 
example, India and China). This study enriches the literature by estimating the effect of the GFC 
on the exports and imports of the major ASEAN economies with intra- and extra-ASEAN 
trading partners.  
Conventional understanding is that peripheral economies are less vulnerable to crisis than 
advanced industrialized countries due to their low degree of integration with the centers of 
financial accumulation. However, ASEAN economies are highly integrated to each other and to 
the core economy through trade. ASEAN integration to core economies occurs through two 
channels: The first channel is direct North-South trade link. The second channel is indirect 
South-South trade link that works through trade of major East Asian economies (for example, 
China, Japan and South Korea) with the Western economies. ASEAN economies are also 
interlinked with major East Asian economies through the regional production network. ASEAN 
firms are involved at different stages of production of a large number of manufacturing products 
that enter into the Western economies from East Asia (Athukorala, 2010). Hence, reduced trade 
for East Asia could be translated into less foreign demand for ASEAN intermediate goods, in 
turn causing trade drops for ASEAN countries.  
                                               
3 Here, North refers to core of the world economy, consisting of the major advanced industrial nations, and South 
refers to the remaining periphery economy. 
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The classic core-periphery analysis of Prebisch (1950) emphasizes the superior position 
of core economies (the North) as manufacturers of finished consumer and producer goods, while 
the periphery (the South) has an inferior position in the supply raw materials. This inferior 
position is reflected in a negative long-period trend in the terms of trade for the South as prices 
of their exports fall relative to the prices of their imports (Bloch and Sapsford, 2000). Subsequent 
developments of the theory have extended the subordinate role of the South to the provision of 
labor-intensive manufactures and services (Wallerstein, 1979; Arrighi, et al, 2003). ASEAN 5 
members occupy the role of both producers of raw materials and labor-intensive manufactures, 
so they may be particularly vulnerable to negative influences on their trading positions from the 
GFC.   
To determine the impact of the GFC on ASEAN, we examine annual export and import 
data from 2002 to 2012 for 5 large ASEAN countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand, among themselves and with 11 major trading partners, which covers 
75% of ASEAN trade.4 We estimate a modified gravity model for the five chosen ASEAN 
economies and their trading partners. Gravity models link a country’s exports and imports to the 
distance from a trading partner, which reflects the transactions cost of that trade, and the 
partner’s GDP, which reflects its potential for demanding exports and supplying imports. We 
modify this basic model by adding dummy variables for the crisis period and for the post-crisis 
period, which capture any residual impacts on trade that may be due to the subordinate position 
of the countries in the international trading system. 
Considering 2008-2009 as the crisis period and 2010-2012 as the post-crisis period, our 
estimation results show ASEAN members’ exports and imports with their major trading partners 
rise and fall with GDP in their trading partners as predicted by the basic gravity model. In 
addition to these changes, ASEAN exports and imports both decline further during the GFC and 
its aftermath. Thus, during the crisis period both declining GDP in trading partners and the 
residual effect captured by the crisis dummy negatively affect ASEAN trade, while in the post-
crisis period rising trading-partner GDP has a positive effect on trade partially or fully offsetting 
the prolonged negative effect from the post-crisis dummy variable. 
                                               
4 We start with 2002 to avoid the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, as this crisis had dramatic impact and may 
have altered the structural trading patterns for ASEAN economies. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly discusses 
ASEAN trade flows in recent years, while Section 3 outlines the analytical framework as well as 
the data and variables. Section 4 presents the econometric results and interpretations. Section 5 
presents calculations of the separate impact of the GFC and GDP changes on bilateral trade 
flows, while Section 6 provides robustness checks. The last section concludes the paper, drawing 
policy implications for post-GFC regional trade policies in ASEAN. 
2. ASEAN Post-Crisis Trade Decline: Overview 
ASEAN is among the regional trading blocs making significant progress in developing intra- and 
extra-regional economic relationships, though diverse opinion exists in the literature about the 
extent of the integration process (for example, Sally and Sen, 2005; Rana, 2007; Pomfret and 
Sourdin, 2009).5 The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was introduced with the objective to 
develop regional competitive advantages, including improving the economic efficiency and 
productivity of its member nations. AFTA removes tariff and non-tariff barriers within the 
region. ASEAN members has also developed free-trade agreements outside the region. These 
include the ASEAN - Republic of Korea Free Trade Area, ASEAN - Japan Free Trade Area, 
ASEAN - India Free Trade Area, ASEAN - China Free Trade Area and ASEAN - Australia New 
Zealand Free Trade Area. In addition, the region has relations with Canada, the European Union, 
Russia, the US and Pakistan.6 
At the beginning of 21st Century, ASEAN members had just recovered from the severe 
1997-1998 Asian economic crisis. The crisis led ASEAN policy makers towards stronger 
regional economic integration rather than towards individual protectionism. Without solid 
economic integration in the whole ASEAN region, the individual economy is more vulnerable to 
shocks from the Western core economies, such as due to GFC. The success of this effort is 
remarkably reflected in ASEAN trade performance. The region has become an important factor 
in world trade (Richardson, 2005). Figure 1 shows recent success in the exports and imports of 
five major ASEAN economies. 
                                               
5  Most criticism of ASEAN integration focusses on the complexity of too many regional and bilateral trade 
agreements. Sally and Sen (2005) express the concern that the excessive number of trade agreements leads to trade 
diversion from members. 
6 Information collected from ASEAN’s official website – www.asean.org 
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Figure 1 illustrates exports and imports of the ASEAN 5 from 1994 to 2013.7 Both 
exports and imports show reasonable progress until 1996, followed by a remarkable decline (of 
imports in particular) during the Asian Crisis. The recovery period continues until 2002-2003, 
followed by a notable improvement in trade. The success story, however, is disrupted badly 
during 2008-2009 GFC. In the immediate post-GFC period, the amount of trade growth (in terms 
of exports and imports) is large by pre-GFC standards. However, growth slows down again in 
2011 for some countries. In 2012 and 2013, the slow growth trend continues, while exports and 
imports even drop for some countries. 
 
Figure 1: ASEAN 5 trade flows (in billion USD) 
 
(a) Exports 
                                               
7 ASEAN 5 includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
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(b) Imports 
[Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from World Bank WDI database] 
Figure 2 presents the year-on-year change in the exports and imports of the ASEAN 5. A 
few remarks are worthwhile about this figure. Since 1995, the major decline in ASEAN trade 
occurs during the GFC (surprisingly, the trade drop during the GFC is much higher than during 
the Asian crisis). Both exports and imports start to decline from mid-2008, drop deeper during 
2009 and revive by early 2010. According to conventional wisdom, this recovery should 
continue over a couple of years, but ASEAN trade flows reflect a different pattern. 
 
Figure 2: Year-on change in ASEAN trade flows (in billion USD) 
 
(a) Exports 
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(b) Imports 
[Source: Authors’ calculation using data from Figure 1] 
The growth rate of ASEAN trade flow shows a declining tendency during mid-2010 to 2011, 
deepening in 2012. During this period, the exports of the Philippines and Indonesia fall in the 
negative zone of year-on-change, whereas for other countries, the export growth rate drops but 
remains positive. However, for all countries, an increase in the export growth rate takes place in 
2013. Similar to that for exports, the story of the declining growth rate also stands for ASEAN 
imports during 2012-2013, and Singaporean import growth is negative for 2013. Thus, both 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 suggest that the post-GFC effect of slowing trade growth extends till 
2012, but that the decline is smaller than in the GFC period. 
3. Analytical Framework and Data 
Economists and commentators often blame the poorly regulated banking system in the US for 
creating excessive global savings and generating the GFC (for example, Krugman, 2009). In 
particular, enormous financial imbalances accumulated during the late 20th Century and early 21st 
Century around the world. (Merrouche and Nier, 2010). The effects of the GFC spread in varying 
degrees to all parts of the world.  
There are two schools of thought with regard to how shocks are transmitted to periphery 
economies from the Western core economies. Keynesian views identify changes in exports due 
to changes in income impacting consumption demand, which are incorporated in the gravity 
model of export (import) flows through positive coefficients of a trading partner’s (domestic) 
GDP. In addition to a demand for goods from abroad, trade requires a supply from the domestic 
economy, which is captured through a positive coefficient of domestic (trading partner) GDP in 
the equation for export (import) flows. The Keynesian effect should create a negative force on 
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trade as GDP falls at home and abroad during crisis period. During post-crisis period, economic 
recovery through increased foreign (domestic) GDP then creates a positive demand for exports 
(imports) to (from) each trading partner, while increased domestic (foreign) GDP provides the 
supply to meet this demand.  
The other view comes from the core-periphery approach, with core economies controlling 
trade relations with peripheral countries to the advantage of the core. Under this view, the GFC 
may have additional adverse trade consequences for the periphery both during and after the crisis 
as the core adjusts trading relationships to protect home interests through protectionism and 
reorienting supply chains.8 This view is incorporated in the model by separating the post-crisis 
period (2010-12) from the crisis period (2008-09). These two views, along with the neoclassical 
gravity modeling (explained under empirical model), comprise the analytical framework of this 
study. Overall, ASEAN trade should be negatively affected by both Keynesian effects and core-
periphery effects during the crisis period. During post-crisis period, the core-periphery effects 
should be partially or fully offset by the positive Keynesian effects.  
The analysis proceeds at two stages. First, the augmented gravity model is estimated to 
directly capture the core-periphery effect of crisis and post-crisis period, results are presented in 
Section 4. Second, specific values are plugged-in to the estimated model to calculate the 
Keynesian effect during crisis and post-crisis period, with results of the calculation presented in 
Section 5. 
3.1. Empirical model 
Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963) propose that trade between two partners is proportional 
to the product of their GDP and inversely proportional to their geographical proximity. Anderson 
(1979) and Bergstrand (1985, 1989) extend the model to provide a ‘theoretical foundation’. In 
later studies, Anderson and Wincoop (2003) establish the use of GDP as a proxy for the 
exporter’s production capacity and the importer’s market size. In another study, Anderson and 
Wincoop (2004) emphasize the importance of trade cost, which is commonly captured in the 
gravity model by using distance as a proxy. Subsequently, additional explanatory variables have 
been added to analyze different perspectives on trade relations (Engel and Rogers, 1996; Frankel 
                                               
8 Fischer (2015) gives a detailed exposition with symbiosis changes of other factors that show the contemporary 
global development (see also Pula, 2014). A related view focusses on the adverse consequences of changes in the 
terms of trade for periphery countries as suppliers of raw materials and intermediate products arising from the 
market power of the core industrialized countries (Bloch and Sapsford, 2000). 
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and Romer, 1999; Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Kimura and Lee, 2006; Kabir and Salim, 2010). In 
some recent studies, the gravity model is used to analyze the effects of exchange rate volatility, 
trade liberalization and regional integration on east Asian trade flows (Chit, Rizov and 
Willenbockel, 2010; Jongwanich, 2010; Sheng, Tang and Xu, 2014). However, to our 
knowledge, this is the first study to analyze the effects of the GFC on ASEAN trade flows 
through applying the gravity model. 
The gravity model used in this study is as follows: 
xytxyxyytxtxyt CLBdistgdpgdptrade   43210 lnlnlnln     (1)
 
Here, xyttrade  is the exports (imports) of the ASEAN 5 member (country x) going to (coming 
from) a trading partner (country y), xgdp is the GDP of country x, ygdp is the GDP of country y, 
xydist  is the distance between the trade partners x and y, and xyt  is the error term. CLBxy is the 
common land border dummy, which is 1 if the country-pair share common land border and “0” 
otherwise. The expected signs for the coefficients of these standard gravity variables 
are 0,0,0,0 4321   .  
Our objective is to estimate the effects of the GFC on ASEAN trade. The GFC originated 
in Western economies, particularly in the US and transmission of the crisis to Asia would not 
occur immediately (see Figure 2). Two dummies are added to the model in Equation (1) to 
account for the impact of the GFC on trade: one for the period of GFC in 2008-2009 and the 
other for the post-crisis period in 2010-2012.9  The dummy variables pick up impacts above and 
beyond any change due to changes in GDP at home and abroad. The model is: 
xytttxyxyytxtxyt postcrisiscrisisCLBdistgdpgdptrade   6543210 lnlnlnln  
(2) 
Here, crisist equals “1” for the years 2008 and 2009 and “0” otherwise. Similarly, postcrisist 
equals “1” for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 and “0” otherwise.  
According to the standard gravity model, β5, the crisis dummy coefficient, and β6, the 
post-crisis dummy variable, are zero as only normal supply and demand captured through GDP 
variables affect trade. However, the core-periphery approach suggests there are adverse effects of 
                                               
9 Our main focus is on impacts on aggregate trade, but the variation of effects across industries is considered as a 
robustness check with results presented in Section 6, along with results from a model that seeks to identify the 
proximate causes of the crisis and post-crisis effects. 
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the crisis and aftermath on the trade of the periphery due to manipulation of trade relations by the 
core. Hence, the signs of β5 and β6 are crucial in this study, with a negative sign indicating a 
structural change to the disadvantage of the trade of ASEAN members. 
In this study, export and import equations are estimated separately as follows: 
xytttxyxyytxtxyt postcrisiscrisisCLBdistgdpgdp   6543210 lnlnlnexpln  (3) 
xytttxyxyytxtxyt postcrisiscrisisCLBdistgdpgdpimp   6543210 lnlnlnln  (4) 
For exports, country x is the exporting country (also mentioned as the reporting country) and 
country y is the trading partner. For imports, country y is the reporting country and country x is 
the trading partner. Technically, both exports and imports are the same relation apart from the 
two opposite directions of trade flows. However, not all trading partners are included in the 
sample of reporting countries so total exports for the data sample don’t equal total imports unless 
trade is balanced. As shown in Figure 1, there are distinct impacts of the GFC separately on 
ASEAN exports and imports. 
Some literature (for example, Chit, Rizov and Willenbockel, 2010) suggests estimation of 
the gravity model using fixed effects may not be reliable because of potential endogeneity. A 
growing trend has been to estimate the dynamic panel using the instrumental variable (IV) 
technique or the generalized method of moments (GMM) technique to address endogeneity. 
However, the estimation accuracy of these techniques greatly varies with the choice of 
instruments and related aspects (Stock, Wright and Yogo, 2002; Kiviet and Feng, 2014; Kiviet, 
Pleus and Poldermans, 2015). For example, the speed of dynamic adjustment, the presence of 
endogenous regressors, the types and severity of heteroscedasticity in GMM are beyond control 
of the investigator (Kiviet, Pleus and Poldermans, 2015). Instead, Sheng, Tang and Xu (2014) 
suggest that the endogeneity issue can be avoided by using country-specific effects. Thus, the 
dominant gravity literature relies on the static panel estimation approach (for example, Sheng, 
Tang and Xu, 2014; Athukorala, 2010; Egger, 2002). In particular, our study follows Egger 
(2002), who suggests choosing between fixed effect and random effect estimations using the 
Hausman-Taylor method (Hausman and Taylor, 1981). In addition, Egger (2002) suggests using 
the estimation method proposed by Hausman and Taylor (HT) in the presence of cross-sectional 
correlation of residuals and this method adjusted for first-order autoregressive disturbances (HT 
AR(1)) in presence of autocorrelation of the residuals. 
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3.2. Description and sources of data 
We estimate determinants of the trade of 5 ASEAN members among themselves and with their 
major non-member trading partners.10 The non-member countries are those at the top of the list 
of ASEAN trade partners in terms of trade volume. Further, ASEAN has developed a free trade 
area with Australia and New Zealand, so Australia and New Zealand are included in the list of 
trading partners. The EU members are excluded from this study to avoid influence of the Euro 
crisis, but then included later to provide a robustness check.11 Vietnam is included as a trade 
partner for other ASEAN members, but not as a panel country due to missing data. Thus, sixteen 
trading partner countries are selected (see list in Appendix Table 1): six are ASEAN members 
and ten are non-members that cover about 75% of ASEAN trade (see Appendix Table 2).  
The estimating equations for imports and exports include the dummy variables for the GFC 
period (2008 and 2009) and for the post-GFC period (2010-2012) along with standard gravity 
equation variables, GDP for the home country and trading partner, distance between trading 
partners and whether the countries share a common land border. Annual data on exports and 
imports are collected from the World Integrated Trade Solution UNCOMTrade database. GDP 
data are collected from the World Bank World Development Indicator (WDI) database. Distance 
between countries is calculated based on the country location provided by the CIA World 
Factbook. Information on common land borders is also collected from the CIA World Factbook 
database.  
4. Discussion of Results: Analysis of Trade Flows 
Export (Equation 3) and import (Equation 4) models are estimated separately, yielding 2 sets of 
results from the panel data. Both fixed effect (FE) models and random effect (RE) models are 
estimated for each panel. Hausman’s specification test (Hausman, 1978) is used to examine the 
existence of a correlation between the error terms and the regressors. If a correlation exists, the 
fixed effect approach is preferred. Otherwise, the random effect approach is preferred. Both 
                                               
10 Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are commonly known as the ASEAN 5. The other 5 
ASEAN countries are excluded from this study due to missing data. 
11 Though the EU crisis originated from the GFC, the consequences of EU crisis and the GFC are different. The 
current study is designed to investigate in depth of the consequences of GFC in ASEAN trade, hence combining two 
consequences is out of scope to this study. However, as a robustness check, we estimate a panel including as trading 
partners the 6 major EU countries (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom) EU members 
in terms of their economic size and trade values. 
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models are estimated using the robust option.12 This approach produces standard errors that are 
‘robust to arbitrary patterns of heteroscedasticity in the data’ (Shepherd, 2013, p.28).13 If serial 
correlation is detected, first-order autoregressive adjustment is used to obtain corrected 
estimates.  As variables are measured in natural logarithms, the estimated coefficients represent 
elasticity, i.e., the coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage change in trade due to a one-
unit change in each explanatory variable.  
Estimation proceeds in three stages for both exports and imports. Initially, the standard 
gravity model is estimated, then the crisis and the post-crisis dummies are added to capture the 
impact of GFC on ASEAN trade. Finally, the models are estimated separately for intra-ASEAN 
and extra-ASEAN trade. The estimation results are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 for the 
export model and in Table 3 and Table 4 for the import model.  
4. 1 Export analysis 
For the export model, the first three columns of Table 1 show the estimation of the standard 
gravity model for exports, while columns 4 to 6 show the estimation of the augmented gravity 
model. The results for intra- and extra-ASEAN exports are shown in Table 2, where estimation 
results for intra-ASEAN exports are presented in Columns 1 to 4 and those for extra-ASEAN 
exports in Columns 5 to 7.  
The Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the FE model 
and the coefficients of the RE model are equal, except for the intra-ASEAN model. Hence, apart 
from intra-ASEAN exports, the estimates of the RE models are preferred to the FE models. The 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) also supports a random effects regression over a 
simple OLS regression. However, the serial correlation test rejects the null hypothesis that there 
is no serial correlation for some models. Hence, we re-estimate the standard gravity model, the 
augmented gravity model and the extra-ASEAN exports model using the Hausman-Taylor 
method with adjustment for first-order autocorrelation (HT AR(1)) as recommended by 
Hausman and Taylor (1981), Egger (2002) and Baltagi et al. (2003). Similarly, we use the HT 
method without adjustment for first-order autocorrelation for estimating intra-ASEAN exports to 
                                               
12 The Hausman test cannot be used for robust estimation, so the Hausman test statistic for RE vs FE is based on the 
original standard errors. 
13 The RE model is also estimated using a maximum likelihood estimator (MLE), yielding virtually identical 
estimated coefficients, which can be obtained from the authors on request. 
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correct for cross-sectional correlation of residuals. Estimates from applying the HT method are 
efficient and consistent as long as the over-identifying restrictions of the method are satisfied.  
Table 1: ASEAN exports 
 Standard gravity model Crisis dummies included model 
 
FE RE HT AR(1) FE RE HT AR(1) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
lngdpx 0.137 0.337*** 0.333*** 0.420*** 0.600*** 0.598*** 
 (0.200) (0.093) (0.077) (0.115) (0.141) (0.188) 
lngdpy 1.024*** 0.809*** 0.812*** 1.032*** 0.831*** 0.833*** 
 (0.337) (0.079) (0.103) (0.341) (0.091) (0.109) 
lndistancexy (omitted) -1.114*** -1.117*** (omitted) -1.147*** -1.149*** 
  (0.163) (0.114)  (0.128) (0.129) 
CLBxy (omitted) 0.096 0.097 (omitted) 0.063 0.064 
  (0.484) (0.274)  (0.284) (0.347) 
Crisist    -0.177*** -0.183*** -0.183*** 
    (0.059) (0.055) (0.063) 
Post-crisist    -0.295** -0.304*** -0.304** 
    (0.121) (0.108) (0.136) 
α0 -9.359** 0.361 0.394 -16.829** -6.717 -6.711 
 (4.238) (2.194) (3.569) (6.969) (5.014) (4.256) 
Hausman test 
preference 
RE (Prob>ChiSq = 0.261)  RE (Prob>ChiSq = 0.827)  
R-sq 0.215 0.4483  0.22 0.45  
No. of 
observation 
825 825 
F (all 
coefficient)/ 
Wald χ2 
110.45*** 298.16*** 156.06*** 77.86*** 418.99*** 376.41*** 
Breusch-
Pagan LM test 
 
Prob>ChiSq = 
0.000 
  
Prob>ChiSQ = 
0.000 
 
Serial 
correlation test 
 Prob > F = 0.0000   Prob > F = 0.0000  
Note: ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. Models are estimated using the robust option.  
 
The model’s ability to explain ASEAN exports is moderate, except for intra-ASEAN 
exports, which is low and suggests there is either substantial random disturbance in exports or 
omitted variables have substantial influence. Particular caution is therefore required in 
interpreting the intra-ASEAN results. Estimates for the standard gravity model (Columns 1 and 2 
of Table 1) are found to be generally statistically significant and with expected signs, though the 
common land border effect is consistently insignificant. Column 3 presents the HT AR(1) 
estimates, which do not vary much from the RE estimates. Estimates of the demand effect from 
GDP of the destination country are uniformly more positive than the corresponding supply effect 
of GDP in the source country, particularly supporting a Keynesian demand interpretation of the 
results. 
Results from the augmented model with the two crisis dummies are presented in Columns 
4, 5 and 6 of Table 1. The coefficient estimates of the standard gravity variables of Column 4 and 
 16 
5 are similar to those in Columns 1 and 2, apart from the higher coefficient value for the 
exporter’s GDP. Coefficient estimates for the crisis and post-crisis dummies suggest that exports 
of ASEAN members are significantly reduced during and after the Global Financial Crisis, 
which supports the view that trading patterns have been altered to the disadvantage of ASEAN 
members as expected in the core-periphery analysis.  In the results using the HT AR(1) method 
with its superior econometric properties, ASEAN exports decline by 17% (1 - e-0.183) during the 
GFC period and by 26% (1 - e-0.304) during the post-GFC period in addition to the impact of 
changing GDP at home and abroad. Adjusting for the different number of years involved, the 
negative impact of the crisis and its aftermath on ASEAN is estimated at about 9% per year 
throughout. 
Next, the augmented model is estimated separately for exports to ASEAN members 
(intra-ASEAN exports) and for exports from ASEAN members to non-member trading partners 
(extra-ASEAN exports), with the results presented in Table 2. The results for intra-ASEAN 
exports are shown in Columns 1 to 4, and those for extra-ASEAN exports are shown in Columns 
5 to 7. In both cases, the coefficients of standard gravity variables estimated by the FE and the 
RE models are generally significant, with the expected sign, aside from the insignificant 
coefficients for the common land border and for the GDP variables in the intra-ASEAN results 
using the FE estimates. 
For the intra-ASEAN export model, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of the FE model and the coefficients of the RE model are equal. Hence, the estimates 
of the FE model are preferred to those of the RE model. There are two types of fixed effects 
models: one is country fixed effects model and the other is country and time fixed effects model. 
Shepherd (2013) suggests a time fixed effect test to identify which fixed effects model is more 
suitable. For intra-ASEAN trade Shepherd’s time fixed effect test rejects the null hypothesis and 
indicates the time and country fixed effect model is needed as the year coefficients are not jointly 
equal to zero. Estimated results for the country and time fixed effect (TFE) models are presented 
in Column 3. However, the cross-sectional dependence test using the Pesaran method rejects the 
null hypothesis that the residuals across entities are uncorrelated. Hence, we use the Hausman 
Taylor method (HT) for estimation, as suggested by Egger (2002), with results presented in 
Column 4. 
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Table 2: Intra- and extra-ASEAN exports  
  Crisis dummies included in the intra-ASEAN model   Crisis dummies included in the extra-ASEAN model 
  
FE RE TFE HT FE   RE HT AR(1) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
lngdpx -0.88 0.776** 0.595 0.643 0.450*** 0.447*** 0.447*** 
 
(1.299) (0.340) (0.757) (0.496) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) 
lngdpy 2.923 0.592** 4.321 1.181*** 0.767*** 0.775*** 0.776*** 
 
(2.085) (0.285) (2.666) (0.450) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06) 
lndistancexy (omitted) -1.167*** (omitted) -1.114* (omitted) -1.001*** -1.001*** 
 
  (0.195) 
 
(0.589) 
 
(0.25) (0.27) 
CLBxy (omitted) 0.016 (omitted) -0.038 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
 
  (0.254) 
 
(0.877) 
   
Crisist -0.571* -0.167 -2.425*** -0.411 -0.074** -0.075** -0.075** 
 
(0.333) (0.142) (1.171) (0.310) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Post-crisist -0.86 -0.27 -3.903*** -0.644 -0.138*** -0.14*** -0.140*** 
 
(0.589) (0.264) (2.025) (0.391) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
α0 -30.37 -4.937 -103.718*** -16.939 -11.007*** -2.537 -2.542 
 
(20.926) (12.493) (57.044) (11.729) (1.89) (2.89) (2.60) 
Hausman test 
preference 
FE (Prob>ChiSq = 
0.0374)  
 
RE (Prob>ChiSq = 0.9654) 
 
R-square 0.03 0.246 0.036 
 
0.47 0.58 
 
No. of 
observation 
 
275 
 
550 
F (all 
coefficient)/ 
Wald χ2 
11.7*** 219.03*** 127.95*** 43.89*** 99.62*** 459.04*** 476.02*** 
Breusch-
Pagan LM 
test 
  
  
  
 
Prob>ChiSq 
= 0.00  
Serial 
correlation 
test 
  
  
  
 
Prob > F = 
0.00  
Time fixed 
effects test 
  
 
4.56***   
   
Pesaran CD 
Test 
    
24.785***, 
ABS=0.572 
        
Note: ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. Models are estimated using the robust option. The 
CLB dummy is dropped from extra-ASEAN model because none of the countries shares a common border. 
 
As noted above, the low R for the intra-ASEAN results suggests the need for caution in 
interpreting these results. There is also instability in the estimated coefficients across the 
different estimation methods as compared to the extra-ASEAN results.   Focusing only on the 
estimates for extra-ASEAN exports from the HT AR(1) method, ASEAN exports decline by 7% 
(1 - e-0.075) during the GFC period and by 13% (1 - e-0.140) during the post-GFC period beyond 
what can be attributed to changes in GDP at home and abroad. 
4.2 Import analysis 
ASEAN imports are also analyzed in three stages. First, the standard gravity model is estimated 
with the estimation results presented in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3. The Hausman test rejects 
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the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the FE model and the coefficients of the RE model are 
equal. Hence, the estimates of the FE model is preferred to those of the RE model. Second, the 
crisis and post-crisis dummies are included in the gravity model. The estimation results for the 
FE and RE models are presented in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3. The Hausman test rejects the 
null hypothesis and prefers the FE model to the RE model. Hence, the country fixed effect model 
is estimated, followed by a time and country fixed effect model and then a test to identify which 
fixed effects model is more suitable. This test concludes that the time fixed effect model is 
needed, so results for the latter model are presented in Column 5. Further, the cross-sectional 
dependence test using Pesaran method suggests that the residuals across countries in the TFE 
results are correlated. Hence, we re-estimate the model using the HT method as suggested by 
Egger (2002) and the results are presented in Column 6. 
 
Table 3: ASEAN imports  
  Standard gravity model Crisis dummies included model 
  
FE RE FE RE TFE HT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
lngdpx 0.878** 0.767*** 0.887** 0.775*** 0.948*** 0.781*** 
  (0.358) (0.068) (0.360) (0.071) (0.280) (0.07) 
lngdpy 0.376 0.41*** 0.704*** 0.492*** 1.416*** 0.528*** 
  (0.243) (0.090) (0.171) (0.146) (0.470) (0.137) 
lndistancexy (omitted) -0.813*** (omitted) -0.824*** (omitted) -0.831*** 
    (0.116) 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.142) 
CLBxy (omitted) 0.343 (omitted) 0.333 (omitted) 0.329 
    (0.255) 
 
(0.260) 
 
(0.418) 
Crisist     -0.177*** -0.025 -0.738 -0.045 
      (0.060) (0.061) (0.477) (0.102) 
Post-crisist     -0.350*** -0.107 -1.144* -0.140 
      (0.116) (0.105) (0.589) (0.125) 
α0 -11.695** -2.955 -20.358*** -5.177 -40.244*** -6.232 
  (4.284) (3.153) (6.820) (4.725) (7.899) (3.538) 
Hausman test 
preference 
FE (Prob>ChiSq = 0.0095) FE (Prob>ChiSq = 0.0062) 
 
 
R-square 0.288 0.4324 0.274 0.427 0.237 
 
No. of 
observation 
825 825 
F (all 
coefficient)/ 
Wald χ2 
67.71*** 202.86*** 52.71*** 269.81*** 73.77*** 330.97*** 
Time-fixed 
effects test 
    
  
18.97*** 
 
Pesaran CD test         
21.298***,  
ABS=0.434 
  
Note: ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. Models are estimated using the robust option.  
 
As with the findings from the export analysis, the standard gravity variables are 
significant and with the expected signs, except for the common land border, which does not 
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significantly influence ASEAN imports. Results for the FE model show a significant negative 
effect of the crisis and post-crisis periods on imports, but the statistical significance of these 
effects dissipates in the TFE results and vanishes in the HT results, which have superior 
econometric properties to the FE, RE and TFE estimates. The lack of significant impact of the 
crisis and its aftermath on import flows in the HT estimates contrasts sharply with the 
corresponding HT results for the effects on ASEAN exports shown in Table 1, with the estimated 
coefficients in the import regression being much smaller in magnitude. 
Table 4 presents results for intra-ASEAN imports and the extra-ASEAN imports, with 
Columns 1 to 4 for intra-ASEAN results and Columns 5 and 6 for extra-ASEAN results. The 
Hausman test prefers the FE estimators for all models. For the intra-ASEAN import models, the 
time and country fixed effects model is preferred, so results of the time and country fixed effects 
estimation are presented in Columns 3. Further, the cross-sectional dependence test for the intra-
ASEAN import model suggests the existence of a correlation among the residuals. Hence, we re-
estimate the model using the HT method and the results are presented in Column 4.  
For intra-ASEAN imports, only the TFE results show negative significant effects of the 
crisis and post-crisis periods, while the other three estimation methods, including the HT method 
with its superior econometric properties, find those dummies insignificant.14 As with the results 
for intra-ASEAN exports, which are based on the pretty much the opposite side of the same flow, 
the R-square values are low suggesting there is either substantial random disturbance in the 
country’s exports or that omitted variables have a substantial influence. As a result, the 
coefficient estimates need to be treated with great caution as is the case with intra-ASEAN 
exports.  
                                               
14 The results for intra-ASEAN imports are very similar to those for intra-ASEAN exports as they are largely just the 
opposite sides of the same trade.  
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Table 4: Intra- and extra-ASEAN imports 
  Crisis dummies included intra-ASEAN model Crisis dummies included extra-ASEAN model 
  
FE RE TFE HT FE RE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
lngdpx 2.506 0.912*** 4.352 1.216*** 0.655*** 0707*** 
 
(2.078) (0.177) (2.612) (0.358) (0.163) (0.09) 
lngdpy -0.358 0.329 1.570* 0.503 0.709*** 0.626*** 
 
(1.310) (0.369) (0.816) (0.412) (0.165) (0.103) 
lndistancexy (omitted) -0.88*** (omitted) -0.866** (omitted) -0501** 
  
(0.249) 
 
(0.431) 
 
(0.185) 
CLBxy (omitted) 0.178 (omitted) 0.123   
  
(0.264) 
 
(0.642) 
  
Crisist -0.516 -0.018 -3.137** -0.265 -0.088** -0.066* 
 
(0.331) (0.120) (1.157) (0.299) (0.035) (0.039) 
Post-crisist -0.876 -0.119 -5.038** -0.505 -0.194*** -0.159*** 
 
(0.570) (0.209) (2.004) (0.371) (0.049) (0.052) 
α0 -33.34** -3.914 -129.476** -16.247 -14.641*** -9.607*** 
 
(20.560) (11.655) (56.367) (10.960) (1.919) (2.229) 
Hausman 
test 
preference 
FE (Prob>ChiSq = 0.033) FE (Prob>ChiSq = 0.0148) 
R-square 0.104 0.225 0.0745   0.536 0.585 
No. of 
observation 
275 550 
F (all 
coefficient)/ 
Wald χ2 
12.74*** 113.91*** 23.75*** 51.30*** 98.78*** 500.09*** 
Time-fixed 
effects test 
  
 
5.89***     
  
Pesaran CD 
Test 
    
20.068***, 
ABS=0.488 
    
 
Note: ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. Models are estimated using the robust option. 
 
We estimate the extra-ASEAN import panel using the Hausman-Taylor model (HT), with 
the results presented in Column 7. The estimated coefficients from the HT model are similar to 
the estimates from the FE model, and the F-value is large and highly significant. Hence, the HT 
model provides the preferred results for extra-ASEAN imports, which show ASEAN imports 
from non-ASEAN countries drop by about 6% (1 - e-0.066) during the crisis period and by 15% (1 
- e-0.159) during the post-crisis period. As with ASEAN exports, these effects are in addition to 
whatever changes are due to changes in GDP at home and abroad. 
Aside from intra-ASEAN trade, our empirical results demonstrate a significant negative 
effect of the GFC on ASEAN export trade during both the 2008-2009 crisis period and an even 
larger effect during the 2010-2012 post-crisis period, which is above and beyond any change due 
to changes in GDP at home and abroad. Corresponding statistically significant negative effects of 
the crisis and post-crisis periods on ASEAN import trade are found only for imports from 
external trading partners.  Overall, these results indicate a disadvantage to ASEAN trade flows 
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from the GFC and its aftermath, which is consistent with the core-periphery approach to 
analyzing international trade flows. 
5. Calculation of “Total” Trade Effect 
Now, we look at the “total” effect of the GFC on the five ASEAN economies’ trade. The idea 
behind this calculation is the combination of two generally offsetting effects, the negative core-
periphery effect of crisis and post-crisis coefficients, and the mostly positive effects of the 
change in the GDP of the home country and their trading partners. Only during the height of the 
crisis in 2009 did the two effects work in the same direction to reduce trade. After the crisis 
period, the negative post-crisis coefficient is offset by generally increasing GDP at home and 
abroad. 
Based on the results for estimation by the HT AR(1) method in Column 5 of Table 1 for 
ASEAN exports and the results from estimation by HT method in Column 6 of Table 3 for 
imports, trade effects are explained as follows: 
ttxyxyytxtxyt postcrisiscrisisCLBdistgdpgdp 304.0183.0064.0ln149.1ln833.0ln598.0711.6expln 
            (5) 
ttxyxyytxtxyt postcrisiscrisisCLBdistgdpgdpimp 140.0045.0329.0ln831.0ln528.0ln781.0232.6ln 
            (6) 
Plugging in the values of the right-hand-side variables into Equations (5) and (6) returns the 
value of exports and imports, respectively, in each year. Growth for the GFC period is calculated 
as the change in exports or imports between 2007 and 2009 and for the post-GFC period as the 
corresponding change between 2009 and 2012. Because distance, common land borders and the 
constant term are constant over time, the calculation of change depends only on GDP growth and 
the crisis or post-crisis effect.  
As an example, Indonesian GDP growth in the GFC period is 10.6% and 18.4% in the 
post-GFC period. Australian GDP growth in the GFC period is 5.5% and 8% in the post-GFC 
period.15 Hence, the total GFC effect on Indonesia-Australia exports during the crisis period is 
(10.6%*0.598+5.5%*0.833-0.183)/2 or -3.67%. Similarly, the total GFC effect on Indonesia-
Australia exports during the post-crisis period is (18.4%*0.598+8%*0.833-0.304)/3 or -4.23%. 
Even though GDP has increased in both Indonesia and Australia during the crisis and post-crisis 
                                               
15 GDP growth is calculated as percentage change of GDP for the period, with data collected from World Bank 
database. (Same GDP data has been used for Panel estimation to ensure consistency). Here, GFC period includes 2 
years (2008 & 2009) and post-GFC period includes 3 years (2010-2012).  
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periods, the calculated “total” effect on Indonesian exports to Australia is negative in both 
periods due to the extra decrease in trade associated with the dummy variable for each period. 
Table 5 presents the results for the calculation of Equation (5), and Table 6 presents 
corresponding results for Equation (6). These results are presented as annual average changes to 
adjust for the different lengths of the crisis and post-crisis periods. Referring to Equation (5), 
both crisis and post-crisis dummies have a significant negative impact on exports, with the 
effects nearly doubling during the post-GFC period. Beginning with Indonesia, results show that 
exports to all trading partners aside from China decline during the financial crisis period due to 
the negative crisis coefficient, as well as the substantial drop in trading partners’ GDP that more 
than offsets the impact of 10% Indonesian GDP growth. During the post-crisis period, high GDP 
growth of Indonesia and its trading partners fully offsets the high post-GFC effect only for China 
and Singapore.  
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand have slower growth in domestic GDP than 
does Indonesia during the crisis period, which makes for a greater negative “total” effect on their 
exports to all trading partners. Even the Philippines, with the highest growth in domestic GDP 
among the four countries, experiences a positive “total” effect on their trade only with China. 
China maintained 5 to 9 per cent average annual growth even during the crisis period (2007-
2009), while average annual growth for other countries was 2 per cent or below, and negative in 
some cases (Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, UAE and USA).  Relatively low GDP growth 
during the crisis period for Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand failed to offset the effect of 
negative crisis-period coefficient and the low GDP growth of the trading partners, leading to a 
negative “total” effect on exports to all trading partners. 
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Table 5: “Total” GFC and post-GFC effects on ASEAN members’ exports 
Reporter Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
Trading 
partners 
Crisis 
period 
Post-
crisis 
period 
Crisis 
period 
Post-
crisis 
period 
Crisis 
period 
Post-
crisis 
period 
Crisis 
period 
Post-
crisis 
period 
Crisis 
period 
Post-
crisis 
period 
Australia -3.67% -4.24% -6.62% -4.37% -5.27% -4.33% -6.50% -2.86% -6.55% -4.80% 
China 1.97% 1.32% -0.98% 1.19% 0.37% 1.23% -0.86% 2.70% -0.90% 0.76% 
Hong Kong -6.11% -2.77% -9.05% -2.91% -7.70% -2.86% -8.93% -1.39% -8.98% -3.34% 
India -0.82% -0.25% -3.76% -0.39% -2.41% -0.34% -3.64% 1.12% -3.69% -0.82% 
Indonesia 
 
-1.35% -4.48% -1.48% -3.13% -1.43% -4.36% 0.03% -4.41% -1.91% 
Japan  -8.68% -4.91% -11.62% -5.05% -10.28% -5.00% -11.51% -3.54% -11.55% -5.48% 
Malaysia  -5.64% -1.53% 
  
-7.23% -1.62% -8.47% -0.15% -8.51% -2.10% 
New 
Zealand  
-6.56% -4.78% -9.51% -4.92% -8.16% -4.87% -9.39% -3.40% -9.43% -5.35% 
Philippines -3.76% -1.47% -6.70% -1.60% 
  
-6.59% -0.09% -6.63% -2.03% 
Saudi 
Arabia 
-4.22% -0.78% -7.17% -0.92% -5.82% -0.87% -7.05% 0.59% -7.10% -1.35% 
Singapore -5.47% 0.57% -8.42% 0.44% -7.07% 0.48% 
  
-8.35% 0.01% 
South Korea -4.49% -3.00% -7.44% -3.13% -6.09% -3.09% -7.32% -1.62% -7.37% -3.56% 
Thailand -5.54% -2.13% -8.48% -2.26% -7.13% -2.22% -8.36% -0.75% 
  
United Arab 
Emirates 
-6.82% -2.82% -9.77% -2.96% -8.42% -2.91% -9.65% -1.45% -9.69% -3.39% 
United 
States of 
America 
-7.25% -4.70% -10.19% -4.83% -8.84% -4.78% -10.07% -3.32% -10.12% -5.26% 
Vietnam -1.36% -1.49% -4.31% -1.62% -2.96% -1.58% -4.19% -0.11% -4.23% -2.05% 
 [Source: Authors’ calculation using data collected from World Bank database] 
 
 24 
Table 6: “Total” GFC and post-GFC effects on ASEAN members’ imports 
Reporter Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
Trading 
partners 
Crisis 
period 
Post-crisis 
period 
Crisis 
period 
Post-crisis 
period 
Crisis 
period 
Post-crisis 
period 
Crisis 
period 
Post-crisis 
period 
Crisis 
period 
Post-crisis 
period 
Australia 2.71% 0.66% 0.11% 0.54% 1.30% 0.58% 0.21% 1.88% 0.17% 0.16% 
China 8.00% 5.87% 5.40% 5.75% 6.59% 5.79% 5.50% 7.09% 5.46% 5.38% 
Hong Kong 0.43% 2.03% -2.17% 1.92% -0.98% 1.95% -2.07% 3.25% -2.11% 1.54% 
India 5.39% 4.40% 2.79% 4.28% 3.98% 4.32% 2.89% 5.61% 2.85% 3.90% 
Indonesia 
  
2.12% 3.25% 3.31% 3.29% 2.22% 4.59% 2.18% 2.87% 
Japan  -1.98% 0.03% -4.58% -0.09% -3.39% -0.05% -4.48% 1.24% -4.52% -0.47% 
Malaysia  0.87% 3.20% 
  
-0.54% 3.12% -1.63% 4.41% -1.67% 2.70% 
New Zealand  0.00% 0.15% -2.60% 0.03% -1.41% 0.07% -2.49% 1.37% -2.53% -0.35% 
Philippines 2.63% 3.26% 0.03% 3.14% 
  
0.13% 4.47% 0.09% 2.76% 
Saudi Arabia 2.20% 3.90% -0.40% 3.78% 0.79% 3.82% -0.30% 5.12% -0.34% 3.40% 
Singapore 1.02% 5.17% -1.58% 5.05% -0.39% 5.09% 
  
-1.51% 4.67% 
South Korea 1.94% 1.82% -0.66% 1.70% 0.53% 1.74% -0.56% 3.04% -0.60% 1.32% 
Thailand 0.96% 2.64% -1.64% 2.52% -0.45% 2.56% -1.53% 3.85% -1.57% 2.14% 
United Arab 
Emirates 
-0.24% 1.99% -2.84% 1.87% -1.65% 1.91% -2.74% 3.20% -2.78% 1.49% 
United States 
of America 
-0.64% 0.23% -3.24% 0.11% -2.05% 0.15% -3.14% 1.45% -3.17% -0.27% 
Vietnam 4.88% 3.24% 2.28% 3.12% 3.47% 3.16% 2.38% 4.46% 2.34% 2.74% 
[Source: Authors’ calculation using data collected from World Bank database] 
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During the post-crisis period (2010-2012), all selected countries (ASEAN members and 
trading partners) experienced positive and relatively large average annual GDP growth. This 
high growth tends to offset the large negative post-GFC coefficient. However, the “total” effect 
on exports from Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand is still negative except for exports 
to China and Singapore, while exports from Singapore are positive only to China, Indonesia, 
India and Saudi Arabia.  
The “total” GFC and post-GFC effects on ASEAN imports (Table 6) are somewhat 
different from those indicated by the export model. The import model yields insignificant 
negative coefficients of crisis and post-crisis dummies on ASEAN imports. The magnitude of 
each coefficient is much smaller than the corresponding coefficient in the export results. Still, for 
purposes of comparison to the export results in Table 5 we include these insignificant estimates 
in calculating the “total” effect on ASEAN imports in Table 6.16 During the crisis period, all 
ASEAN countries show a negative “total” effect on imports, except Philippines in its trade with 
China and Indonesia in its trade with Australia, China, India, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and 
Vietnam. Yet, during post-crisis period, the “total” effect on imports is generally positive as 
positive GDP growth at home and abroad more than offsets the negative impact of the post-crisis 
dummy variable.  
Overall, this section confirms that negative GDP growth intensifies the core-periphery 
effect during the crisis period. However, in the post-crisis positive GDP growth effect is strong 
enough to offset the prolonged negative core-periphery effect from post-crisis ASEAN trade for 
at least import flows in most of the ASEAN 5. The “total” effect on export flows remains 
negative for most of the ASEAN 5 in the post-crisis period, with the general exception of trade 
with China. 
6. Robustness checks 
We check the robustness of our results by estimating alternative specifications of the models in 
Table 1 for exports and Table 3 for imports as well as expanding the sample of trading partners 
and segmenting the data to look at results for specific industries. First, we re-estimate the models 
using an approach where the crisis and post-crisis dummies of Equation (3) and Equation (4) are 
                                               
16 Removing the effect of the crisis and post-crisis coefficients adds about 2% a year to the estimate of the “total 
effect on imports during the crisis period, while during the post-crisis period the addition is about 5% a year. 
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replaced by individual year-specific GFC dummies. The results are presented in Appendix Table 
3 for exports and Appendix Table 4 for imports.   
The results for ASEAN export flows in Appendix Table 3 are broadly similar to those 
estimated with the crisis and post-crisis variables in Tables 1 and 2, showing statistically 
significant negative estimated coefficients for all year dummy variables beyond 2008 aside from 
the results for the intra-ASEAN export trade. The GFC2009 dummy shows a greater impact than 
the estimated crisis period effect, which reflects the absence of a strong negative effect on trade 
in 2008. Also, during the post-crisis period, there is generally some lessening of the negative 
effect on trade in 2010 before the negative impact increases again and reaches a peak in 2012.   
The results for imports in Appendix Table 4 are also broadly similar to corresponding 
results with crisis and post-crisis variables in Tables 3 and 4. Only the results for imports from 
extra-ASEAN trading partners have statistically significant estimated coefficients for the year 
dummy variables, with imports in the preferred RE estimates observed to increase by 
approximately 8% in 2008 before declining by 21% in 2009 and somewhat smaller amounts in 
subsequent years, which suggests a lagged and persistent effect of the GFC on extra-ASEAN 
imports. 
A further check on the specification of the augmented gravity model is conducted by 
introducing additional explanatory variables that might be responsible for the deterioration of 
ASEAN trade flows in the crisis and post-crisis periods. First, the dramatic growth of the 
Chinese economy has substantially changed trading relationships in Asia, so we add Chinese 
GDP as an explanatory variable. Second, fluctuations in world industrial production have been 
found to impact strongly on the price of raw materials relative to finished products in the global 
supply chain (Bloch and Sapsford, 2000), so we also add a variable measuring world industry 
production (OECD index of industrial production).  
Appendix Table 5 presents the estimated results of the extended model. The Hausman 
test supports the RE model for both exports and imports. We include HT AR(1) results for 
exports and HT results for imports as these are the preferred estimation results for exports in 
Table 1 and imports in Table 3, respectively. In comparison to these preferred results, adding the 
explanatory variables weakens the negative effect associated with the crisis and post-crisis 
variables. Indeed, the estimated coefficients for these variables in the import model with HT 
estimation are both positive. However, both crisis and post-crisis coefficients are found 
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insignificant for exports and imports. Chinese GDP is found to have an insignificant effect on 
exports in the HT AR(1) results for exports and the HT results for imports, while the coefficients 
for world industrial production are positive and significant in all estimates. Thus, the negative 
impact on ASEAN exports associated with the crisis and post-crisis variables in Table 1 
seemingly reflects their sensitivity to fluctuations in global production, which is consistent with 
the position of ASEAN economies as suppliers of raw materials and intermediate products 
according to the core-periphery theory of international trading relations (Bloch and Sapsford, 
2000). 
A further robustness check involves expanding the sample of trading partners to include 
the major EU economies, UK, Germany, France, Netherlands, Italy and Spain. The results are 
shown in Appendix Table 6. When comparing across the same estimation method, the results for 
are similar to those with the original sample of countries. In particular, all the standard gravity 
variables have the expected sign and are generally statistically significant, while the crisis and 
post-crisis coefficients are all negative. One notable difference is that the estimated coefficients 
for the crisis and post-crisis variables in the HT results for imports in Table 6 are larger in 
magnitude than the corresponding estimates in Table 3 and they are statistically significant. 
A final robustness check is to determine whether the effects on total exports and imports 
apply equally across various industries within the ASEAN 5 economies. We estimate the 
augmented gravity equation models from Table 1 for exports and Table 3 for imports using data 
for separate industries and show results for two very different, but both important, industries, 
agriculture (UNCOMTRADE database classification SITC 0+1+2-27-28+4) and machinery in 
Appendix Table 7 and in Appendix Table 8. 
Results for both separate industries are similar for the corresponding regressions in Table 
1 for exports and Table 3 for imports. However, crisis and post-crisis coefficients for both 
exports and imports are found to be less negative in the agriculture results in Table 7 than for the 
corresponding coefficients for total exports and imports in Table 1 and Table 3, respectively. In 
contrast, the crisis and post-crisis coefficients in the machinery results in Table 8 are more 
negative than the corresponding coefficients for total exports and imports. For both agriculture 
and machinery, effects are more negative in the post-crisis period compared to the crisis period, 
but not all estimated coefficients are statistically significant. 
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7. Conclusion 
We analyze the effects of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) on trade flows of five major 
ASEAN economies using an augmented gravity model. The analytical framework used here 
combines the Keynesian and the core-periphery approaches to understanding the impact of 
external shocks on developing countries. Our results support both approaches, suggesting that 
external shocks enter ASEAN trade both through changes in trading partner GDP (Keynesian 
effect) and as an additional negative effect that occurs even during the recovery of the core 
economies. Burgess and Connell (2013) make a similar point by saying “…. it is important to 
note that the GFC is still ongoing ….” (Burgess and Connell, 2013:279).  
Our estimate of the “total” effect of the GFC on trade flows of all major ASEAN 
economies with most trading partners is strongly negative during the crisis period as falling GDP 
combines with a negative residual effect. During the post-crisis period, there is an even stronger 
negative residual effect, but rising GDP leads to a positive change in imports for most of the 
ASEAN economies from most trading partners. However, the estimated “total” effect on exports 
is still generally negative, which suggests the deterioration in the trading position of ASEAN 
economies is ongoing in the aftermath of the GFC. 
This finding is important for ASEAN policy makers. The highly-interrelated trade and 
production network within ASEAN and in East Asia creates a self-reinforcing trap for their 
regional trade in a crisis period. If the shock is extra-regional, the length of the post-shock effect 
depends a great deal on non-ASEAN trading partners’ economic performance and structural 
changes to the international trading system that disadvantage the periphery. However, ASEAN 
economies currently enjoy high domestic economic growth, which works well as a recovery 
mechanism to offset any extra-regional shock. This crisis recovery mechanism is built into 
ASEAN members’ market-oriented intra-regional economic integration process. High real GDP 
growth of the ASEAN countries induces intra-regional demand every year. This growing intra-
regional demand partially offsets the crisis-affected slow consumption demand of the non-
ASEAN market. This demonstrates the importance of maintaining strong economic growth in 
each of the ASEAN countries to maintaining the trade performance for the group as a whole.  
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Appendix 
Appendix Table 1: Organization of the country panel 
 Exports and Imports 
Reporter Indonesia   Malaysia   Philippines   Singapore   Thailand 
Trading 
partners 
Australia  Australia  Australia  Australia  Australia 
 China  China  China  China  China 
 Hong Kong  Hong Kong  Hong Kong  Hong Kong  Hong Kong 
 India  India  India  India  India 
 Japan   Indonesia  Indonesia  Indonesia  Indonesia 
 Malaysia   Japan   Japan   Japan   Japan  
 New Zealand   New Zealand   Malaysia  Malaysia  Malaysia 
 Philippines  Philippines  New Zealand   New Zealand   New Zealand  
 Saudi Arabia  Saudi Arabia  Saudi Arabia  Philippines  Philippines 
 Singapore  Singapore  Singapore  Saudi Arabia  Saudi Arabia 
 South Korea  South Korea  South Korea  South Korea  Singapore 
 Thailand  Thailand  Thailand  Thailand  South Korea 
 
United Arab 
Emirates 
 
United Arab 
Emirates 
 
United Arab 
Emirates 
 
United Arab 
Emirates 
 
United Arab 
Emirates 
 United States   United States   United States   United States   United States  
 Vietnam   Vietnam   Vietnam   Vietnam   Vietnam 
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Appendix Table 2: ASEAN trade by partner country, 2011 (as of November 2012) 
ISO 
Code 
Trade partner 
country 
Value of trade (in US$ thousand) Share of total (as a %age) 
Exports from 
ASEAN 
Imports by 
ASEAN 
Total trade 
Exports 
from 
ASEAN 
Imports 
by 
ASEAN 
Total 
trade 
CN China 127,908,473.6 152,497,073.0 280,405,546.5 10.3 13.3 11.7 
JP Japan 145,197,715.2 128,149,352.1 273,347,067.3 11.7 11.2 11.4 
US 
United States 
of America 
106,305,608.9 92,480,307.6 198,785,916.5 8.6 8.1 8.3 
SG Singapore 94,756,931.4 77,173,522.3 171,930,453.7 7.6 6.7 7.2 
MY Malaysia 75,798,397.4 70,584,648 146,383,044.9 6.1 6.2 6.1 
KR South Korea 54,467,989.6 70,002,911.9 124,470,901.5 4.4 6.1 5.2 
ID Indonesia 59,155,264.1 43,494,586.6 102,649,850.8 4.8 3.8 4.3 
HK Hong Kong 81,312,851.0 15,402,084.2 96,714,935.2 6.5 1.3 4.0 
TH Thailand 40,695,909.4 48,012,261.8 88,708,171.2 3.3 4.2 3.7 
IN India 42,754,703.5 25,674,078.1 68,428,781.5 3.4 2.2 2.9 
AU Australia 37,253,936.2 22,220,465.8 59,474,402.0 3.0 1.9 2.5 
AE 
United Arab 
Emirates 
13,770,477.0 31,356,430.7 45,126,907.7 1.1 2.7 1.9 
SA Saudi Arabia 4,513,017.5 36,186,266.5 40,699,284.0 0.4 3.2 1.7 
VN Viet Nam 22,365,208 11,475,478.1 33,840,686.2 1.8 1.0 1.4 
PH Philippines 18,429,032.1 12,123,805 30,552,836.7 1.5 1.1 1.3 
NZ New Zealand 4,569,261.6 3,667,474 8,236,735.9 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Total ASEAN trade with 
16 selected countries 
929,254,776.4 840,500,745.0 1,769,755,521.4 74.8 73.3 74.1 
 [Source: ASEAN Merchandise Trade Statistics Database and authors’ calculation] 
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Appendix Table 3: Estimation results for ASEAN exports (crisis and post-crisis dummies are replaced by year-specific GFC dummies)  
  Total imports Intra-ASEAN model Extra-ASEAN model 
  
FE RE HT AR (1) FE RE HT FE RE HT AR (1) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
lngdpx 0.456*** 0.627*** 0.625*** -0.864 -0.789**  0.663 0.475*** 0.471***  0.471*** 
 
(0.107) (0.148) (0.168)  (1.282) (0.349) (0.507) (0.093) (0.087) (0.079) 
lngdpy 1.034*** 0.834***  0.836*** 3.009 0.600**  1.239*** 0.761*** 0.77*** 0.770*** 
 
(0.345) (0.092) (0.110) (2.136) (0.291) (0.462) (0.103) (0.090) (0.090) 
lndistancexy (omitted) -1.151***  -1.152*** (omitted) -1.167***  -1.110* (omitted) -0.999*** -0.999*** 
 
  (0.128) (0.120)   (0.197) (0.606) 
 
(0.246) (0.272) 
CLBxy (omitted) 0.06  0.060 (omitted) -0.014  -0.048 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
 
  (0.286) (0.283)   (0.257) (0.902) 
  
 
GFC2008 -0.121* -0.120**  -0.120* -0.531 -0.097  -0.369 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 
 
(0.069) (0.059) (0.069) (0.355) (0.148) (0.372) (0.031) (0.031) (0.027) 
GFC2009 -0.271*** -0.274***  -0.274*** -0.719* -0.257*  -0.533 -0.161*** -0.162*** -0.162*** 
 
(0.066) (0.061) (0.073) (0.385) (0.153) (0.370) (0.042) (0.042) (0.039) 
GFC2010 -0.249** -0.254***  -0.254** -0.764 -0.207  -0.567 -0.112** -0.114*** -0.114*** 
 
(0.105) (0.094) (0.108) (0.533) (0.228) (0.423) (0.043) (0.042) (0.039) 
GFC2011 -0.332** -0.332***  -0.332** -0.953 -0.288  -0.716 -0.155*** -0.157*** -0.158*** 
 
(0.139) (0.119) (0.140) (0.659) (0.282) (0.467) (0.048) (0.047) (0.046) 
GFC2012 -0.395** -0.395***  -0.396** -1.113 -0.362  -0.836* -0.194*** -0.196*** -0.196*** 
 
(0.156) (0.133) (0.158) (0.746) (0.327) (0.494) (0.052) (0.051) (0.042) 
α0 -17.806** -7.442  -7.442 -32.986 -5.472  -18.917 -11.468*** -3.019 -3.024 
 
(7.380) (5.240) (6.276) (22.679) (12.953) (12.140) (1.972) (2.930) (3.089) 
Hausman test 
preference 
RE (Prob>ChiSq = 0.983)   RE (Prob>ChiSq = 0.1487)   RE (Prob>ChiSq = 0.9991) 
 
R-square 0.221 0.455   0.03 0.246   0.472 0.581 
 
No. of 
observation 
825 275 550 
F (all 
coefficient)/ 
Wald χ2 
65.9*** 778.29***  857.94*** 14.22*** 353.34*** 44.09***  71.06*** 615.12*** 721.45***  
Note: ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively 
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Appendix Table 4: Estimation results for ASEAN imports (crisis and post-crisis dummies are replaced by year-specific GFC dummies)  
  Total imports model Intra-ASEAN model Extra-ASEAN model 
  
FE RE HT FE RE HT FE RE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
lngdpx 0.883** 0.775***  0.781*** 2.603 0.921***  1.267*** 0.636*** 0.694*** 
 
(0.364) (0.071) (0.071) (2.217) (0.179) (0.370) (0.163) (0.092) 
lngdpy 0.737*** 0.499***  0.540*** -0.338 0.342  0.541 0.723*** 0.634*** 
 
(0.166) (0.153) (0.140) (1.295) (0.379) (0.425) (0.166) (0.106) 
lndistancexy (omitted) -0.824***  -0.832*** (omitted) -0.88***  -0.864* (omitted) -0.492*** 
 
  (0.116) (0.143)   (0.251) (0.449) 
 
(0.186) 
CLBxy (omitted) 0.332  0.327 (omitted) 0.176  0.113 (omitted) (omitted) 
 
  (0.261) (0.421)   (0.267) (0.668) 
  
GFC2008 -0.066 -0.101  0.077 -0.473 0.068  -0.214 -0.06 0.082** 
 
(0.071) (0.067) (0.124) (0.351) (0.124) (0.259) (0.038) (0.042) 
GFC2009 -0.317*** -0.157**  -0.180 -0.681* -0.126  -0.407 -0.236*** -0.211*** 
 
(0.065) (0.064) (0.123) (0.381) (0.128) (0.358) (0.039) (0.042) 
GFC2010 -0.312*** -0.09  -0.122 -0.758 -0.047  -0.423 -0.195*** -0.163*** 
 
(0.099) (0.090) (0.139) (0.515) (0.181) (0.407) (0.043) (0.045) 
GFC2011 -0.373*** -0.106  -0.144 -1.005 -0.156  -0.605 -0.173*** -0.138** 
 
(0.136) (0.116) (0.151) (0.638) (0.229) (0.446) (0.055) (0.057) 
GFC2012 -0.433*** -0.142  -0.184 -1.151 -0.207  -0.701 -0.213*** -0.173** 
 
(0.153) (0.131) (0.159) (0.722) (0.256) (0.471) (0.066) (0.070) 
α0 -21.08** -5.347  -6.527* -36.331 -4.468  -18.524* -14.477*** -9.554*** 
 
(7.220) (4.911) (3.614) (22.239) (11.997) (11.089) (1.975) (2.290) 
Hausman test 
preference 
FE (Prob>ChiSq = 0.0384)   RE (Prob>ChiSq = 0.1262)   RE (Prob>ChiSq = 0.0702) 
R-square 0.274 0.428   0.1038 0.2255   0.533 0.585 
No. of 
observation 
825 275 550 
F (all 
coefficient)/ 
Wald χ2 
59.06*** 507.67*** 334.53***  17.72*** 202.00***   66.43*** 574.37*** 
Note: ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively 
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Appendix Table 5: Robustness check for additional control variables 
 
Export Imports 
 
FE RE AR (1) HT FE RE HT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
lngdpx 0.215 0.521** 0.518*** 0.999*** 0.732*** 0.756*** 
 
(0.409) (0.212) (0.176) (0.309) (0.059) (0.084) 
lngdpy 0.987*** 0.821*** 0.822*** 1.374*** 0.134** 0.302 
 
(0.297) (0.084) (0.101) (0.458) (0.168) (0.249) 
lndistancexy (omitted) -1.114*** -1.135*** (omitted) -0.767*** -0.797*** 
  
(0.143) (0.145) 
 
(0.122) (0.171) 
CLBxy (omitted) 0.073 0.074 (omitted) 0.375 0.356 
  
(0.285) (0.236) 
 
(0.242) (0.497) 
Crisist -0.037 -0.041 -0.041 -0.128 -0.102 0.105 
 
(0.155) (0.089) (0.092) (0.089) (0.096) (0.169) 
Post-crisist -0.115 -0.124 -0.124 -0.045 -0.032 0.033 
 
(0.155) (0.166) (0.175) (0.154) (0.169) (0.217) 
lnchinesegdp -0.015 -0.124 -0.115 -0.856*** 0.101 -0.021 
 
(0.289) (0.259) (0.229) (0.306) (0.223) (0.252) 
industrialproduction 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.022*** 0.020** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) 
α0 -11.206 -2.434 -2.414 -17.482*** -0.316 -1.430 
 
(5.687) (5.313) (5.918) (5.551) (5.501) (5.053) 
Hausman test preference RE (Prob>ChiSq = 0.957)  RE (Prob>ChiSq = 0.0799)  
R-sq 0.219 0.454 
 
0.039 0.451 
 
No. of observation 825 825 
F (all coefficient)/ Wald χ2 93.45*** 919.20*** 973.02*** 84.74*** 650.22*** 346.15*** 
Note: ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively 
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Appendix Table 6: Estimation results for panel with EU countries included 
 Export Imports 
 
FE RE HT AR (1) FE RE HT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
lngdpx 0.356** 0.514*** 0.512*** 0.814*** 0.797*** 0.814*** 
 (0.149) (0.112) (0.099) (0.127) (0.061) (0.217) 
lngdpy 0.996*** 0.818*** 0.819*** 0.637*** 0.458*** 0.637*** 
 (0.127) (0.072) (0.086) (0.149) (0.104) (0.149) 
lndistancexy (omitted) -1.141*** -1.143*** (omitted) -0.863*** -0.888*** 
  (0.163) (0.125)  (0.132) (0.167) 
CLBxy (omitted) 0.062  0.063  (omitted) 0.319  0.296  
  (0.494) (0.358)  (0.394) (0.415) 
Crisist -0.169** -0.179** -0.179*** -0.142* -0.047 -0.142* 
 (0.080) (0.076) (0.044) (0.079) (0.075) (0.079) 
Post-crisist -0.216** -0.244** -0.243*** -0.231** -0.08 -0.231** 
 (0.102) (0.095) (0.080) (0.102) (0.092) (0.102) 
α0 -14.789** -4.158 -4.151 -17.259*** -4.567* -9.429*** 
 (3.044) (2.903) (3.849) (3.035) (2.704) (3.034) 
Hausman test 
preference RE (Prob>ChiSq = 0.573)  FE (Prob>ChiSq = 0.0077)  
R-sq 0.093 0.4139  0.1085 0.4678  
No. of observation 1155 1155 
F (all coefficient)/ 
Wald χ2 81.51*** 412.19*** 51.30*** 100.78*** 525.64*** 436.19*** 
Note: ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively 
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Appendix Table 7: Industry-specific results – Agriculture industry 
 
Export Imports 
 
FE RE AR (1) HT FE RE HT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
lngdpx 0.969*** 0.793*** 0.758*** -0.159*** 0.349*** 0.301** 
 
(0.275) (0.099) (0.092) (0.301) (0.123) (0.123) 
lngdpy 0.097 0.552*** 0.507*** 0.894 0.475*** 0.511*** 
 
(0.299) (0.076) (0.088) (0.249) (0.130) (0.185) 
lndistancexy (omitted) -0.669*** -0.627*** (omitted) -0.390 -0.348 
  
(0.134) (0.147) 
 
(0.285) (0.284) 
CLBxy (omitted) 0.833*** 0.832*** (omitted) 1.496*** 1.484* 
  
(0.232) (0.215) 
 
(0.399) (0.859) 
Crisist -0.014 -0.088* -0.052 0.054 0.049 0.053 
 
(0.033) (0.046) (0.035) (0.056) (0.061) (0.118) 
Post-crisist -0.158 -0.321*** -0.264** -0.009 -0.016 -0.011 
 
(0.114) (0.116) (0.117) (0.099) (0.103) (0.149) 
α0 -8.448*** -10.608*** -8.859*** -0.197 0.102 -0.144 
 
(2.725) (2.466) (2.302) (2.862) (3.043) (4.673) 
Hausman test preference FE (Prob>ChiSq = 0.0064)  RE (Prob>ChiSq = 0.0514)  
R-sq 0.212 0.440 
 
0.007 0.202 
 
No. of observation 825 
 
825 
 
F (all coefficient)/ Wald χ2 58.89*** 363.65*** 303.40*** 36.93*** 149.86*** 101.07*** 
Note: ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively 
 
Appendix Table 8: Industry-specific results – Machinery industry 
 
Export Imports 
 
FE RE AR (1) HT FE RE HT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
lngdpx 0.802*** 0.299*** 0.356*** 0.196 1.174*** 0.989*** 
 
(0.274) (0.092) (0.133) (0.399) (0.142) (0.159) 
lngdpy 0.378 0.767*** 0.741*** 1.187*** 0.272 0.457* 
 
(0.309) (0.111) (0.113) (0.354) (0.168) (0.238) 
lndistancexy (omitted) -1.311*** -1.290*** (omitted) -2.026*** -1.867*** 
  
(0.214) (0.215) 
 
(0.268) (0.369) 
CLBxy (omitted) -0.380 -0.392 (omitted) -0.096 -0.147 
  
(0.383) (0.489) 
 
(0.429) (1.118) 
Crisist -0.185*** -0.097** -0.115** -0.137** -0.091 -0.105 
 
(0.039) (0.051) (0.049) (0.057) (0.072) (0.152) 
Post-crisist -0.535*** -0.395*** -0.423*** -0.444*** -0.369*** -0.393** 
 
(0.112) (0.114) (0.090) (0.101) (0.143) (0.192) 
α0 -10.147*** 3.170 2.221 -16.123*** -2.075 -3.199 
 
(2.898) (2.257) (2.626) (4.280) (3.655) (6.014) 
Hausman test preference FE (Prob>ChiSq = 0.0245)  FE (Prob>ChiSq = 0.0008)  
R-sq 0.065 0.351 
 
0.040 0.505 
 
No. of observation 825 825 
F (all coefficient)/ Wald χ2 40.02*** 206.6*** 214.53 25.61*** 214.86*** 180.00*** 
Note: ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively 
 
